The excessive prevalence of typhoid fever in the United States has been characterized, and not without reason, as a national disgrace. Certainly that portion of our typhoid prevalence which is due to polluted water supplies is preventable, and our failure to prevent does not redound to our credit. The rather common use of sewage -polluted water supplies without purification has been responsible for disaster in the shape of typhoid-fever epidemics in our cities, with a frequency not pleasant to contemplate. Such supplies untreated and unfiltered are exposed also to contamination from persons ill with or harboring the germs of Asiatic cholera sliould such persons gain access to the United States.
It is useless to expect that the dejecta of all persons ill with typhoid fever or cholera will be properly disinfected before reaching the sewers, especially if the contributor is a carrier who shows no signs of illness. It is evident that the surest and most prompt protection against water-borne diseases can be afforded in each case By proper treatment or filtration of the public water supplies. With cholera, we have only the menacing possibility, but with typhoid fever we have the actual existence of the disease in such a high rate of prevalence that the United States suffers seriously by comparison with other civilized countries.
The average American citizen displays toward sanitary problems a very dangerous apathy. It is difficult to arouse his interest in anything so well known as typhoid fever. Cholera or plague or any scourge which to him suggests a quick and mysterious death will awaken his instinct of self-preservation and arouse him to activitv; not so typhoid fever. It has been all about him always, excites no terror, and is viewed indifferently as an inevitable visitation which comes every year and takes its toll from the community. He never asks himself, Is this visitation inevitable? Or, May not typhoid fever be prevented or reduced? Twenty deaths per 100,000 probably represent 200 cases of typhoid fever. Suppose 200 cases of Asi.tic cholera occurred in any American city of 100,000 population, would not strenuous activity e displayed and very properly so for the eradication of the scourge? Although the case mortality rate of typhoid fever is lower than that of cholera, yet typhoid fever is transmissible I Read Mar. 5, 1912 , before the Illinois Water Supply Association at Urbana, Ill. 35 (421) March 22, 1912 422 in more ways, is more expensive m its lingerig course, and more disastrous in its sequelas than Asiatic cholera. The mental attitude toward typhoid fever, displayed by many physicians. and especially health officers, is scarcely more commenda'ble. Their complacency in the face of typhoid fever rates of above 20 deaths annually per 100,000 population is difficult to explain. If the rate is below 20, many mumcipal officials are inclined to be satisfied with this rate as it is low compared with less fortunate cities.
What may be considered a low rate for typhoid fever? Table  1 shows the death rates per 100,000 population in 10 large European cities. The average for 10 years is given in the first column. The average for 5 years in the second column. The other columns show the rate for the individual years from 1906 to 1910, inclusive. The figures are given for 10 years to show that the low rates are consistent and not a mere coincidence. These 10 cities represent a population of about 15 million persons, and the average death rate per 100,000 population for the 10 years was only 3.4 . The rates are gradually getting lower and the rate for these 10 cities combined, with a population of 15 millions, was only 2.5 in 1910. TABLB 1.-Annual death rates from typhoid fever per 100,000 population in 10 Buro.
pean cities.
Average Average for yrs 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1901-1910.1901-1905 Table 2 shows 15 other European cities which in 1909 and 1910 did not reach double figures in typhoid death rates per 100,000 pUlation. These 15 cities represent a total population of over 9 millions. The average rate for the total population was only 5.3 in 1909 and 4.5 in 1910. ...................................................................... 2.6 . B irminah .6.0 3.9 Beat.
.6. 2 3.9 Lyo. 5.8 4.4 LJeeds. .. . . 7.2 3.8 Liverol . 8.4 3.9 Sheeleld. 9.4 3.0 Rotterdam.. 6.4 6.5 Arsterdam. 3.8 6.7 PBadrd.. 8.4 5.6 ra d fo rd . ...............................................................4.3 9.2 Leipsig . ....8.3 7.5 Total average rate . 5 . 4 . Table 3 shows the remaining eight cities in northern Europe with populations in excess of 300,000. These eight cities have a population of about 7j millions. Their total average rate for 1909 was 13.9, and for 1910, 15.6 . These rates would be considered low in America, but the European officials consider the persistence of such rates to be a reflection. To recapitulate, in northern Europe the 33 principal cities, with an aggregate population of 31,500,000, had an average typhoid death rate per 100,000 population of 6.5 in 1909 and 1910. This includes such notorious tvyphoid centers as St. Petersburg, which had a rate of 33.7 in 1910 . The rate in St. Petersburg is considered to be due to the water supply, which is partly filtered and partly raw Neva water. It is clear that in cities which have had safe water supplies for a period of years the rate should not be above 5 per 100,000 unless some unusual condition exists, such as poor control of milk or lack of control over patients and caxriers. Now let us compare typhoid-fever rates in American cities. Table 4 shows our honor roll for 1909 and 1910 . These are the typhoid-fever death rates among the 50 cities in the United States with more than 100,000 inhabitants. One city, Bridgeport, Conn., has a rate below 5. Three cities-Paterson, N. J., Cincinnati, Ohio, and Cambridge, Mass.-have rates below 10 per 100,000. Twentytwo other cities have rates of from 11 to 20 deaths per 100,000, and the remaining 24 cities have rates of from 20 to 86. New.Haven, Con. 20.5 17.9 Washington, D. C. ............................................... 34.3 23.2 Athmta, a. 50.6 50. 1 Chicago, Ill...... ........................................1..................... 12.6 13.7 Indianap>olis I nd 22.3 28.5 Louisville, 4.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~45.0 31.7 okvQ,15 28.4 31.5 New Orlen La284. ..................................................................... 36.8 86.7 Jerseyty,N. J...........................3.........................6.......... 8.8 11.5 Newark, 25.0 Excess of deaths from typhoid fever in America cities. .............. 18.5 So that on an average in every 100,000 population we had, compared with European results, 18.5 deaths and at least 180 cases of typhoid fever which should never have occurred. A conservative estimate for 1910 will place the deaths from t;yphoid fever above 25,000. When we consider that the smaller cities in America have in general higher rates than the larger, that the rural typhoid is high and in many sections higher than the urban, that in the sections not included in the registration area sanitary conditions are probably worse and typhoid fever rates higher than within the area, we are forced to conclude that a general rate of 25 is probably below the actual deaths from typhoi fever per 100,000 population in the entire United States.
The excess of 18 deaths per 100,000 in the urban population alone shows that we have had in the 50 cities mentioned above, at least, 3,600 deaths and probably 36,000 cases of typhoid fever which were preventable and should never have occurred. For (1910) , and, second, the seasonal distribution suggests water as a prime factor. Explanation of these two points is furnished by a study of the cases as shown in Table 5 , from which it is clear that water was responsible for the high rate, and that thishigh rate was due entirely to the abnormal rate m wards 21 to 27, inclusive. 13.4 Death rate per 100,000, wards 21 to 27.46.9 Wards 1 to 20 were supplied with filtered water. The aggregate population of these 20 wards was 401,622. The typhoid-fever death 4March 22, 1912 rate per 100,000 in 1910 was 13.4. Wards The failure to install a purification plant is usually due to an undue confidence in a water supply which is safe "most of the time." It is difficult for some officials to understand, without a severe lesson, that it is not sufficient to have a water supply that is safe for 360 or 361 days in the year, and to these officials it seems scarcely justifiable to require expensive purification for the sake of the four or five days in the year during which, due to weather conditions, pollution may take place. Such a supply, with a favorably placed intake, may escape pollution for more than a year. There was no evidence of serious pollution of the water supply of the city of Erie during the year 1909, yet the appalling disaster of January and February, 1911 , showed that pollution could take place under certain weather conditions.
There is also too much confidence placed in unfiltered surface supplies from inhabited watersheds. Even where there is alleged control of the watershed and ample storage, pollution may occur. In the run-off increased, affording greater dilution and increased storage, the water returned to norma and the typhoid fever dropped to a minimum. The most serious defect in samtary control of our water supplies is the lack of proper daily bacteriologic examination of the water and quantitative estimation of the B. coli content. In some of the lake cities there is proper daily bacteriologic examination of the water supply, but in many of them there is either an imperfect examination or none at all. One citywith a slow sand filter plant of three units and a consumption equal to the safe filter capacity of the beds operates these without rest, putting the units in service "green" and with an occasional examination ofthe water once or twice a month.
As a result this city in 1910 had a typhoid-fever death rate of over 300 per 100,000. One large city using unfiltered lake water is so sure that the water is pure that examination is made only occasionally. One of the largest lake cities using an unfiltered supply exposed to sewage pollution makes a bacterial count daily, but restricts its effort to detect sewage pollution to the antiquated and indefinite test of inoculating a gumea pig occasionally with a small portion of a brotlh culture.
It is the plain duty of a municipality to provide its citizens with pure water. It is not sufficient to warn against a supply as dangerous and advise its use only for fire, lawn sprinkling, or factory purposes, as at Flint or Saginaw. There are many people in every city who are like children and must beprotected even against themselves. The lazy, poor, and ignorant will drink and use the polluted public supply from a convenient tap rather than travel a considerable distance to a pump or buy bottled water which they can ill afford. Neither is it sufficient to have a safe supply for 360 days out of the year, waring the people to boil the w-ater on the other 5 days. The notice to boil the water is based on bacteriologic findings which are 24 hours late. The notice is often ineffective, and by some ignored. The factors affecting sewage pollution of a water supply and which determine the relative danger to be anticipated from such pollution are: The amount of pollutmg material, the presence of pathogenic organisms, the time of transit from the source of pollution to the waterworks intake, and the amount of water available for dilution.
Provided that the amount of polluting material is considerable, that typhoid fever is prevalent on the watershed, and that the time of transit is within the bounds of time deemed necessary for the natural death of bacteria, pollution of the intake will take place. The last factor, the amount of dilution, will determine the mtensity of the pollution. If the polluting material is great in amount or if a swift current cuts down the time of transit, prevents sedimentation, and retards dilution, then gross pollution results.
With a dilute pollution one need not expect a great explosive outbreak, but many cases of typhoid may result, especially following floods and rains. Often in the absence of explosive outbreaks in the winter or spring months it will be demonstrable that too many deaths from typhoid fever occur in the first half of the year. On the other hand, it is reasonable to suppose that the dilute infection may be responsible for many scattered cases which can not be traced to water. These cases may not appear in sufficient numbers in any particular month to be remarkable or they may be obscured by occurring in the months when typhoid fever is accepted as an inevitable visitation.
Water may be responsible for many cases of typhoid when it is impossible to prove the case against it. We are able to fix the guilt on the water supply only im massive outbreaks of explosive character, but smaller doses of pollution can be responsible or smaller outbreaks of many cases spaced over a long period without any hope of provig this causation.
When cities have a public water supply polluted by sewage, or admittedly exposed to pollution, the obvious thing to do is to filter or treat the water and protect the public from infection. Unfortunately there is a deplorable tendency to abuse the town above and to spend years in an effort to compel (usually without legal process) sewage treatment in the offending municipality. In other cities where the pollution is due to their own sewage, years are lost in the discussion of methods of sewage purification, while the dangerous untreated and unfiltered water is furnished to the citizens.
In regard to sewage disposal it must be remembered that no general rule can be formulated which will cover with justice every case. Each municipality becomes a separate problem and local conditions must be studied. Remedies for correction of improper sewage disposal wiUl differ according to the local conditions. Even if all the sewage from our large cities and towns was prevented from reaching the lakes and rivers, it would be impossible to prevent pollution from reaching these waterways in times of storm and flood, so that sewage disposal even carried to the degree of sterilizing the effluent does not give us a substitute for water filtration or treatment. While it is impracticable to prevent pollution of the Great Lakes, it is possible and imperatively necessary that such pollution be controlled and kept within safe bounds. It would be very foolish from an economic 429 Mtarch 22, 1912 standpoint not to avail ourselves of the cheapest and simlnest method of sewage d al viz, disposal by dilution, provided that this may be done without danger to the water supplies of other communities and without putting an unreasonable burden and excessive responsibility upon the filter plants of those communities. The point to which this method of disposal may be permitted must be determined by local conditions. There is a crying need in the United States for official standards of drinking water. In view of the fact that bacterial counts may be low in a comparatively dangerous water, and sometimes a high count might be found in water containing no evidence of fecal bacteria, the colon estimation is of primary importance in judging the character of a raw water. There should be standards for the permissible colon content of raw water. These should be fixed after careful study of the ability of filter plants and other processes to remove colon and other fecal bacteria. These standards for raw water and for filtered or treated water would enable us to strike a balance between sewage purification and treatment of water, and to determine the degree of sewage purification necessary to assure a raw water of reasonable quality at a given point. These standards would also mark the extent to which disposal of sewage by simple dilution might be permitted with safety. As a general proposition, it is cheaper to treat drinking water than to purify sewage. 1. In the prevention of typhoid fever there is a necessity for safe water suppes for 365 days in the year.
2. Unfiltered surface supplies may be exposed to a dangerous pollution for a few days or even for a few hours only. 3 . Supplies derived by impounding surface waters and which depend upon storage alone to nullify the pollution of an inhabited watershed may be very dangerous in periods of drought and low water. The proportion of pollution is relatively greater at such times and the time of storage is greatly reduced.
4. Purification, whether by storage, filtration, or chemical treatment, must be efficient at all times, and this can not be assured without daily bacteriologic control. 5 . It is essential that a daily quantitative estimation of B. coli be made, as a low bacterial count does not necessarily mean a safe water without absence of B. coli.
6. There is a necessity for close supervision of municipal plants by the State to correct structural and operative defects and insure a safe water at all times. 7. Bacteriologic control and State supervision would insure cleaning when necessary and should prevent the putting in service of slow sand filters before the Schmuttzdecke is ripe. 8 . In order to control typhoid fever and eliminate water-borne typhoid it is not sufficient alone to have a purification plant. In aZdition the purification must be efficient and the purified water must be available m all parts of the city.
9. The danger o dual water supplies is apparent, especially if the polluted supply is easy of access and the safe supply difficult to reach or expensive.
10. In protecting the public health, purification of the public water supply is usually prmary and sewage disposal secondary, but often a judicious adjustment of the two agencies is necessary especially for economic reasons. Sewage disposal will rarely if ever make a sewagepolluted water supply absolutely safe, but is often an aid and sometimes a necessity to furnishing a reasonably good raw water for the purification plant.
A "PUBLIC-HEALTH WEEK" IN BALTIMORE. Under the auspicies of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of 3. House and barn, shoowing antirat devices. 4. House screened against yellow fever. In addition to the above, there were miscellaneous photographs and colored drawings and prepared specimens illustrating the activities of the service in relation to the mvestigation of leprosy, plague, rabies, tuberculosis, aninal parasites, etc. or any of the subdivisions thereof, or any of the designations "condensed skimmed milk," "condensed or concentrated milk" or "modified milk," without special permit in wrting therefor from the board of health, subject to the conditions thereof. The special permit shall specify the grade or subdivision thereof or the special designation of milk which the holder of such permit is authorized to keep for sale or offer for sale, as aforesaid.
None of the provisons thereof, however, shall apply to condensed milk when contained in hermetically sealed cans. [Amendment to Sanitary Code adopted Jan. 4, 1912.] Regulations. (434) 5. The milk shall be delivered to the consumer only in sealed bottles which have been sealed at the dairy and shall be labeled with the day of the week upon which the earliest milking, of which the contents of the bottle form part, has been drawn. 6 Requirements, rules, and regulations.-L. Only such cows shall be admitted to the herd as have not reacted to a diagnostic injection of tuberculin. 2 . All cows shall be tested annually with tuberculin, and all reacting animals shall be excluded from the herd. 3 . No milk from reacting animals shall be shipped to the city of New York for any purpose whatsoever. 4 . The farms at which the milk is pDroduced must obtain at least 75 points in an official score of the department of health. These 75 points shall be made up as follows: A minimum of 32 points for equipment and 43 points for method. 5 . The milk shall not contain more than an average of 60,000 bacteria per cubic centimeter when delivered to the consumer or at any time prior thereto. 6 . Unless otherwise specified in the permit, the milk shall be delivered to the consumer only in bottles.
BELECTED MIL (PAsTZURZED).
Definition.-Selected milk (pasteurized) is milk produced at farms holding permits therefor from the board of health and produced and handled in accordance with the following requirements, rules, and regulations:
Requirements, ruies, and regulations.-1. The farms at which the milk is produced must obtain atleast 60 points in an official score of the department of health. Of these 60 points, a minimum of 20 points shall be required for equipment and a minimum of 40 points for method.
2.All milk of this grade shall be pasteurized, and said pasteurization shall be carried on under a special permit issued therefor by the board of health, in addition to the permit for "selected milk (pasteurized)." 3. The milk shall not contain more than an average of 50,000 bacteria per cubic centimeter when delivered to the consumer or at any time after pasteurization and prior to such delivery. 4. Unless otherwise specified in the permit, the milk shall be delivered to the consumer only in bottles. 5 . All containers in which pasteurized milk is delivered to the consumer shall be plainly labeled "pasteurized.' Labels must also bear the date and hour when pasteurization was completed, the place where pasteurization was performed, and the name of the person, firm, or corporation performing the pasteurization. 6 . The milk must be delivered to the consumers withm 30 hours after the completion of the process of pasteurization. 7 . No milk shall be pasteurized more than once. 8 . No milk containing in excess of 200,000 bacteria per cubic centimeter shall be pasteurized.
General regulations for grade A.-l. The caps of all bottles containing milk of grade A shall be white, and shall contain the words "Grade A" in black letters, in large type.
2. If cans are used for the delivery of milk of grade A, the said cans shall have affixed to them white tags with the words "Grade A" printed thereon in black letters, in large type, together with the designation "Inspected milk (raw)" or "Selected milk (pasteurized)," as the quality ofthe contents may require. Requirements rules, and regulations.-1. The milk after pasteurization must be at once cooled and placed in sterilized containers, and the containers immediately closed.
2. All containers in which pasteurized milk is delivered to the consumer shall be plainly labeled "pasteurized.' Labels must also bear the date and hour when the pasteurization was completed, the place where pasteurization was performed, and the name of the person, firm, or corporation performing the pasteurization. 3 . The milk must be delivered to the consumer within 36 hours after the completion of the process of pasteurization. 4 . No milk shall be pasteurized more than once.
5.
No milk containing an excesive number of bacteria shall be pasteurized. General regulation for grade B.-1. Cap of bottles containing milk of grade B shall be white and marked "Grade B " in brightgreen letters, in large type.
2. The necks and shoulders of cans contaiing milk of grade B shall be painted bright green, and a metal tag shall be affixed to each can with the words " Grade B " in large type, and the words of the subdivision to which the quality of the milk in the said can conforms.
GRAD-C (73)R COOKNG AND MANUFACTURING PuarSos ONLY).
Definition.-Raw milk not conforming to the requirements of a,ny of the subdivisions of grade A or grade B. Requirements, rules, and regulations.-1. Milk of this grade shall not be sold at retail from stores. 2 . Milk of this grade may be sold to restaurants, hotels, and manufacturing plants only. 3. Cans containing milk of grade C shall be painted red on necks and shoulders, and shall be provided with a metal tag containing the words "Grade C" in large type. All creameries handling milk of different grades will be required to demonstrate to the department of health that they are capable of keeping the grades separate, and must keep records satisfactory to the department of health concerning the amount of milk of each grade handled each day.
Definition.-This is milk of any grade or subdivision thereof from which any part of the water has been removed, or from which any part of the water has been removed and to which sugar had been added. Rules 
transportation of milk, condensed milk, or cream shall be conspicuously displayed on the outside of the wagon so that it may be readily seen from the street. 5 . Every permit for the sale of milk, of any grade or designation, in a store slhall be so conspicuously placed that it may be readily seen at all times. 6 . All stores selling or keeping for sale milk, condensed milk, or cream will be frequently inspected and scored by a system adopted by the department of health, and the revocation of the permit of any store may ensue if the score is found repeatedly below the required standard. 7 . The revocation of a permit may ensue for violation of any of the rates and regulations of the department of health. 8 . The revocation of a permit may ensue upon repeated conviction of the holder thereof of the violation of any section of the Sanitary Code relating to the adulteration of milk of any grade or designation.
1. Sanitary requrements.-Milkl, condensed milk, or cream shall not be kept for sale nor stored in any stable or room used for sleeping or domestic purposes, or in any room if in communication with such stable or room, or with water-closet apartments, except when such water-closet apartments are inclosed by a vestibule and are properly ventilated to the external air.
2. Milk, condensed milk, or cream shall not be sold or stored in any room which is dark, poorly ventilated, or dirty, or in which rubbish or useless material is allowed to accumulate, or in which there are offensive odors. 3 . The vessels which contain milk, condensed milk, or cream, while on sale, must be so protected by suitable covers and so placed in the store that the milk, condensed milk, or cream will not become contaminated by dust, dirt, or flies. 4 . Cans containing milk, condensed milk, or cream shall not be allowed to stand on the sidewalk or outside of the store door. 5 . Milk, condensed milk, or cream must not be transferred from cans to bottles or other vessels on the streets, at ferries, or at railroad depots, except when transferred to the vesl of the purchaser at the time of delivery. 6. Cans in which milk, condensed milk, or cream is kept for sale, shall be kept either in a milk tub,,properly iced, or in a clean ice box or refrigerator in which these or similar articles of food are stored. 7 . All containers in which milk, condensed milk, or cream is handled, transported or sold, must be thoroughly cleaned and sterilized before filling, but such cleaning shall not be done nor shall sluch containers be filled in any stable or in any room used for sleeping or domestic purposes, or in any room having connection with such stable or rooms, or with water-closet apartments, except when such water-closet apartments are inclosed by a vestibule and are properly ventilated to the external air. 8 . All dippers, measures, or other utensils used in the handling of milk, condensed milk, or cream must be kept clean while in use, and must be thoroughly cleaned with hot water and soapsuds directly after each day's use.
9. The ice box or ice tub in which milk, condensed milk, or cream is kept must be maintained in a thoroughly clean condition and must be scrubbed at such times as may be directed by the department of health. [Regulations, department of health, adopted Jan. 4, 1912.] The following is taken from the discussion of the considerations which influenced the department of health in making the above amendments to the sanitary code and milk regulations as it appeared in the January, 1912, bulletin of the New York City department of health:
Why Pasteurization Is Neoessary. In any discussion of pasteurization, as used in connection with modern and approved methods of municipal control, it is hardly necessary to state that the term refers to thorough and efficient heating, under careful supervision by the public health authorities, in accordance with regulations based on the results of scientific research as to the temperatures and duration of exposure thereto, necessary to destroy diseaseproducing bacteria.
During the past three years the course of events has furnished striking proof of the need of such pasteurization of all except special grades of milk. By means of a wellorganized system of inspection, based on the issue of permits to ship and sell milk in New York City, the department is in a position to trace the history and source of all milk brought into the city, and is thereby enabled to undertake satisfactory detective work in determining the causes of given outbreaks of infectious diseases due to contaminated milk. Studies carried out in this manner have proved beyond reasonable doubt that since August, 1909, at least two extensive outbreaks of typhoid fever in the city were caused by the infection of particular milk supplies from chronic bacillus carriers. In the case of one outbreak traced to Camden, N. Y., the infection came from a dairyman who had had typhoid fever in Wisconsin in 1863. The subsequent history of his family shows that the disease had attacked nearly every member of his household, including farm laborers who had worked with him from time to time.
Bacteriological examinations in 1909, 46 years after he had had the disease, resulted in the development of almost pure cultures of typhoid-fever bacilli.
Danger from "Typhoid Carriers."
The necessity of extraordinary precautions on the part of a municipality to guard its milk against such danger is self-evident. Typhoid-bacillus carriers are not the rare phenomena they were formerly supposed to be, and the presence of even one of these unfortunate persons in the great army of workers engaged in producing and handling the milk supply of a large city is a source of danger which is the more threatening and insidious because it is so impossible to detect by ordinary means. To 41...'l'. 3----.......... .... ..... ..... ..... ....,''' 5 l--i 61 Feb. 17. Feb. 24. Total rats and mongoose taken ...................................................... 
573
Rats trapped ................................................................... 
381
Mongoose trapped .............................................................. 
8
Rats killed by sulphur dioxide ...................... ...... 184 Examined becteriologically ..................................................... 503 Classiflcation of rats trapped: Mus alexandrinus ............................................................... 
50
Mus musculus .................................................................. 71 73
Mus norvegicus ................................................................. 54 46
Mus rattus ................................................................233....... 212 Averae number of traps set daily ..................................................1720 1720 Classfication of rats killed by sulphur dioxide:
Mus alexandrinus ............................ .......... 12 Mus norvegicus .............................. ......... 171 Mus rattus ...................................................................... 171
Death from Plague at Honokaa. March 22, 191' oqosquito-eradication measures conducted at Honolulu from Feb. 19 to 24, 1912 Wlrhen a foreign or coastwise vessel berths at a Philippine Government pier the master of the vessel shall, immediately after the lines have been secured to the pier, cause rat guards of sufficient size and proper constructioni to be placed on all the lines leading to the pier so as to prevent any rats from going ashore.
PAR. II. The master of a vessel alongside a pier shall also be required to have suitable rat guards placed on all lines leading from lighters or cascoes to the vessel.
PAR. III. No cargo shall be discharged from or received on board a vessel at a pier before suitable rat guards have been placed on all the lines leading from the carriers to the vessel and from the vessel to the pier. PAR. IV. When a vessel berthed at a pier has not a supply of suitable rat guards on board, a sufficient number shall be loaned to the vessel by the wharfinger m charge of the pier, receipt to be taken in each case for the rateguards and the vessel held responsible for the loss of any of the rat guards so loaned.
PAR. V. All foreign anld coastwise vessels docking at the Philippine Governmenit piers shall be fended off from the piers a distance of at least 6 feet. PAR. VI. All cargo chutes and gangways connecting the vessel with the pier shall be removed at night, as soon as the vessel has stopped work of discharging or receiving cargo and not put in place again until the following morning. This does not apply to the gangways of passenger vessels, which need not be remo-x ed unitil the pier is actually closed and work has beenl stopped.
PAR. VII. The gates at the side entrances to the piers shall be kept closed, and the guard gates at the main entrance to the piers shall be lowered each night as soon as the work on the pier ceases.
PAR. VIII. The wharfinger in charge of the pier shall be held strictly and personally accountable while on duty for the carrying out of these regulations, with the exception of those contained in Paragraphs II and III, for the strict observantce of which the customs inspector in charge of the vessel shall be held responsible. When the pier is closed and the wharfinger not on duty, the inspector in charge of the vessel during the daytime and at nighttime when tht0 vessel works, shall be held accountable for the observance of all the regulations contained in this General Order. The night watchman on duty at the piers shall also, in the absence of the wharfinger or inspector, be required to prevent, if possible, any violation of these regulations and report all violations of same taking place during his tour of duty.
PAR. IX. For the violatioin of any of the provisions contained in Paragraphs I, II, and III of this General Order, the master of the vessel shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5, Philippine currency, and not more than ?500, Philippine currency, in the discretion of the court. PAR . X Feb. 7 , 62 cases present. Feb. 13, 33 Feb. 24 566,131 Antwerp ...........l.Feb. 17 316,604 Assuncion...... Jan. 13 75,000 |Feb. 19 250,010 Barmen ...........l.Feb. 10 170,900 Do Feb. 17 Batavia Jan. 27 2 , Do Feb.
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